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Book Reviews
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY. By Eva
H. Hanks, A. Dan Tarlock, and John L. Hanks. St. Paul, Minne-
sota: West Publishing Company. 1974. Pp. xxx, 1242. $20.00.
1
The literature of environmental policy and law has grown prodi-
giously during its rapid emergence beginning in the late 1960's. judge
Harold Leventhal has described the emergence of this field of law as
"the law ablaze."' Some of the growth has been more apparent than
real, for it has been a restructuring of previously existing law relating
to the conventional fields of conservation of natural resources, wildlife
management, urban and regional .planning, and public health. The en-
vironment has emerged as a new organizing concept, restructuring the
old issues into new configurations. 2 But new elements have also been
added.
Among these new elements in the law are those concerned with
growth-growth of population in general, growth of particular com-
munities, economic growth, and growth of particular industries such as
those producing inorganic energy or food. Another novel element is the
translation of the concept of economic externalities into law. This in-
novation has arisen as an aspect of pollution control and has affected
judgments regarding the reasonableness of economic burdens placed on
private industry by pollution control laws. Since January 1, 1970 the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)5 has been signed,
and both the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970' and the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 19721 have been adopted.
Each of these statutes, particularly NEPA, established new norms for
'Leventhal, Environmental Dedsionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA.
L. REv. 509 (1974).
2 Note Timothy Atkeson's observation: "Areas previously considered as unrelated
aspects of administrative, constitutional, international, public health, tort, property, tax
or natural resources law are being reexamined in the resolution of environmental issues."
ENmRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, FEMUAL ENVMONMENTAL LAW 5 (E. Dolgin & T.
Guilbert eds. 1974).
'42 U.S.C. §§4321-47 (1970).
'42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-58 (Supp. II, 1972).
8 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. II, 1972).
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environment-related acts of government and industry and affected the
structure of intergovernmental relationships.
Since the publication in 1970 of a symposium edited by Malcolm
Baldwin and James K. Page, Jr.,' a literature of environmental policy
and law has rapidly emerged, based upon new and reinterpreted statutes,
federal and state, and upon cases in the courts and before administrative
boards and appellate bodies. This law is now being summarized and
analyzed in volumes such as the Hanks-Tarlock volume. Recent sum-
mations of environmental law, most designed for law students, include
two large volumes of documentary material, cases and commentary by
Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. ;' a two-volume casebook by Victor J. Yannacone,
Jr. and Bernard S. Cohen ;' a volume of essays on federal environmental
law edited by Erica L. Dolgin and Thomas G. P. Guilbert ;O and the very
comprehensive casebook by Oscar S. Gray."0 Each of these books
presents environmental law from a distinctive point of view. The
Hanks-Tarlock volume, like the others in the field, is a compilation of
the work of diverse scholars, administrators, and jurists, but the selec-
tion reflects the compilers' understanding and weighing of the relevant
literature.
The volume is divided into five parts: Perspectives (conceptual
background), Population, Judicial Review of Complex Decisionmaking,
Land and Resources Management and Control, and Pollution Control.
Thus, the organizing principle is both procedural and substantive. Its
scope is less comprehensive than that of the Reitze or Gray volumes and
does not provide the in-depth analysis of Dolgin and Guilbert, par-
ticularly in relation to administrative law and procedure (the latter is
also given more emphasis by Reitze). But its casebook function is to
bring together the basic materials on environmental law, and it does this
very adequately with a form designed for use in the classroom and for
reference by practitioners in those areas which it treats, such as popula-
tion, land use, and pollution control. Given the broad and indeterminate
scope of the field, the book cannot be fairly faulted for leaving uncovered
some aspects of environmental law, such as radiation, wildlife, and
transportation.
Like Reitze, but to a much greater extent, the authors emphasize
6 LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT (M. Baldwin & J. Page, Jr. eds. 1970).
7A. REITzE, Jm, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2d ed. 1972), A. RErrzE, JR, ENviloN-
MENTAL PLANNING: LAW OF LAND & REsouRcEs (1974).
81 & 2 V. YANNACONE, 3P & B. COHEN, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
(1972).
9 Dolgin & Guilbert, supra note 2.
100 . GRAY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVmONMENTAL LAW (2d ed. 1973).
[Vol. 50:607
BOOK REVIEWS
population at the beginning of their volume. Their sections on Perspec-
tives and on Population provide the basic setting for the balance of the
volume, but in keeping with the character of the book, these sections
provide a selective cross section of opinion rather than a comprehensive
statement of a particular viewpoint, such as that represented in the
First and Second Reports to the Club of Rome."' For a casebook
representative of the current, unsettled state of law and opinion, their
treatment is probably appropriate, certainly prudent. But the book
leaves with the instructor the responsibility for estimating the relative
significance of trends and the responsibility for e-Nploring the relation-
ship between social beliefs and behavior in relation to the human en-
vironment on the one hand and law on the other.
Among the comprehensive casebooks, Hanks-Tarlock appears to
have the most distinct focus on the issues of growth and complexity.
The authors have used economic thought and perspectives to illuminate
environmental issues. But the economic perspective, although necessary
to an adequate overview of environmental law, may not be sufficient.
It is in their emphasis on assessing legal principles from the vantage
point of economics that this reviewer finds himself in partial disagree-
ment with the authors.
The methods and findings of the natural sciences with respect to
the biosphere and the relationship between man and the environment
are more relevant to that reality which environmental law must ultimately
confront than are the theories of economists. Moreover, the natural sci-
ences afford a sharper disciplinary contrast than economics. (Fortun-
ately, the contrasting assumptions of economics and science are jux-
taposed in the initial chapter of the casebook.) Law and economics are,
metaphorically, children of the same parent "moral philosophy." The
tests of truth implicit in the writings of RawlsI2 and Kaysen," included
in the casebook, are those of secular theology. In contrast, truth as
perceived by Ehrlich and Holdren,' 4 and Hardin 5 is only coincidentally
related to conditions described by legalists and philosophers as equitable
and just. The economics of nature, called ecology, is governed by "laws"
of a character unlike those made by politicians and judges. There is no
I1 D. MEADOWS, THE LimTrrs To GROWTH (1972) [Report I]; M. MASAROVIC & E.
PESTEL, MANKIND AT THE TURNING POINT (1974) [Report II].
12J. RAWILS, A THEORY OF JusTICE (1971), reprinted in part in E. HANKS, A.D.
TARLoCK, & J. HANKS, ENVIRONMiENTAL LAW AND POLICY 8 (1974).
13YKaysen, The Computer that Printed Out W*O*L*F, 50 FORIEGN AFFAIRs 660
(1972), reprinted at 18.
14 Ehrlich & Holdren, Book Review, 14 ENVONmENT 24 (1972), reprinted at 43.
15 Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968), reprinted at 75.
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plea bargaining with nature, and competitive exclusion operates without
remedy or remorse.
The tendency of the law to confine its purview to practical (i.e.,
feasible) matters is what so often makes the law appear irrational to
the scientist; it seems little more than a convenient social fiction when
tested by reference to scientific findings. It is this reviewer's hope that
if, and when, the Hanks-Tarlock casebook is revised or extended, the
law-science interface will equal or, preferably, exceed that relating to
economics. Scientific information and opinion have assumed a place in
environmental law and litigation of increasing importance. The problems
that specialized scientific and technological information present to the
judiciary have suggested the possibility of special environmental law
courts and the use of scientists as aides to the court or special referee."6
II
The selection of criteria for determining factual truth is always a
major factor in the interpretation of law. This is especially so in
situations where a new body of law and policy emerges based on as-
sumptions at variance with those which have traditionally been accepted.
Environmental legislation is an example of just such a situation based
as it is on scientific evidence rather than on traditional concepts of
justice, rights, and equity. Science has been invoked in legislation per-
taining to air and water pollution, pesticides, nuclear radiation, and
ecosystem protection. There are, moreover, assumptions in much of
this legislation that reflect a new ordering of values and priorities in
American life. NEPA is the most obvious case in point, but there are
other examples in both federal and state law: e.g., legislation to protect
the coastal zone from uncontrolled development; designation of wilder-
ness areas, and wild and scenic rivers; and laws regulating the taking of
wildlife and the restoration of strip-mined lands. Judicial difficulty
arises when courts attempt to strike a balance among values based upon
differing and often incompatible modes of thought.
The root of the judicial problem, identified by Professor Tarlock
in his well-known essay17 on the implications of the Calvert Cliffs case, 8
reprinted in the casebook, is the lack of consensus on the values and
16 Cf. Leventhal, supra note 1, at 517.
17 Tarlock, Balancing Envirnomental Considerations and Energy Demands: A Com-
ment on Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 47 IND. L.J. 645, 677
(1972).
Is Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), re-
printed at 266.
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priorities that should guide the application of environmental law. The
law is thus handicapped by the retarded development of policy consensus.
The extent to which ecologically sustainable environmental relation-
ships of human society can be reconciled with concepts of civil and
economic rights cannot now be credibly predicted. But if nature and
not man has the final word in environmental affairs, human welfare
will be best served by seeking and respecting the true meaning of natural
processes and systems and reexamining these values and assumptions
that may ultimately prove universally destructive regardless of short-
term or particular advantage.
In summation, environmental law has appeared as an expression of
man's changing perception of his circumstances and possible future.
But the change is in process and, within modem society, there are strong
and even dominating commitments to prescientific assumptions and
beliefs. Under these conditions the state of the law will be what it now
is, inconsistent, incomplete, and often unpredictable in its interpreta-
tion and its effects. To remedy these conditions may be more a task of
political science and jurisprudence than of law in its more specific, posi-
tive sense.
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